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The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 states that, as a principle of responsible fiscal 
management, a New Zealand government should ensure total Crown debt is at a 
prudent level by ensuring total operating expenses do not exceed total operating 
revenues.  In this paper a structural VAR model is estimated to evaluate the impact on 
the government￿s cash operating surplus (or budget balance) of four independent 
disturbances: supply, fiscal, real private demand, and nominal disturbances.  Based on 
the distribution of these disturbances, stochastic simulations are undertaken to derive 
the level of the ex ante cash budget balance needed to achieve an actual cash budget 
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1. Motivation  and  methodology 
 
Recognition of the dynamic effects of government budget deficits, the importance of policy 
credibility, timing difficulties associated with discretionary fiscal policy as a result of ￿inside￿ 
and ￿outside￿ lags, and difficulties many countries have experienced trying to reverse large 
fiscal deficits led to renewed interest in the specification of government budget balance rules 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  For example, in several US states there exist strict balanced 
budget rules.  For countries participating in stage III of the European Monetary Union, the 
Maastricht Treaty imposes a deficit ceiling of 3 per cent of GDP (and a debt limit of 60 per 
cent of GDP) and the Stability and Growth Pact specifies particular circumstances where a 
deficit can be regarded as excessive.   
 
Changes in the role and conduct of monetary policy and new developments in 
macroeconomic research techniques during the past two decades have also prompted a 
reassessment of the role of counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  In a recent summary of these 
developments, Taylor (2000) concluded that macroeconomic policy research based on 
model simulations of alternative policy rules suggests that when monetary policy is focused 
on inflation and is more sensitive to deviations of actual GDP from potential GDP, it is 
appropriate to let fiscal policy have its counter-cyclical impact through the automatic 
stabilisers rather than through discretionary policy changes.  In an interesting departure from 
some of the types of models considered by Taylor, Wren-Lewis (2000) concludes that 
institutional issues and questions of political economy rather than the ineffectiveness of fiscal 
policy appear to lie behind the reluctance in recent years to assign fiscal policy to short-run 
stabilisation. 
 
Although the appropriate role for fiscal policy therefore remains an important ongoing issue 
for research and debate, some of these ideas and developments have nevertheless had a 
significant influence on fiscal policy in New Zealand during the 1990s.  In particular, the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 (FRA) specifies that a government must achieve operating 
surpluses every year until a prudent level of debt is achieved.
1  This effectively requires a 
government to generate cash-flow surpluses in order to reduce debt levels.  Although the 
FRA does not specify a prudent level of debt
2, the Act does imply that a government must 
                                                
* We are grateful to Iain Rennie and Michele Lloyd for their initial suggestion to undertake this research, to Ron 
Bewley, Paul Conway, Andrew Crisp, Paul Hansen, John Janssen, Dorian Owen, Chris Plantier and Graeme 
Wells and to participants at the NZ Association of Economists’ Conference during September 2000 and at the 
Australian Macroeconomics Workshop during April 2001 for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. We are 
also grateful to  Struan Little for his help with the fiscal data and to Elisa Eckford for proof reading.  Thomas 
Dalsgaard and Alain de Serres, whose study on prudent budgetary margins for European Union countries 
motivated this study, deserve special thanks for providing us access to their programmes and European data to 
enable us to verify our own programmes. 
1 Specifically, the principles of responsible fiscal management set out in the FRA include: “Reducing total 
Crown debt to prudent levels…. by achieving operating surpluses every year until prudent levels of debt have 
been achieved,” and “Maintaining total Crown debt at prudent levels by ensuring that, on average, over a 
reasonable period of time, total operating expenses do not exceed operating revenues.” (New Zealand 
Government, 1994). 
2 However, the FRA requires a government to publish its long-term objectives for total Crown debt and the 
operating balance.  This is done in the Budget Economic and Fiscal Update (New Zealand Treasury, 2000).  The  
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set its fiscal parameters ex ante in order to achieve a target budget balance consistent with 
some desired outcome for public debt.   
 
A common way to view a government￿s budget balance is to assume it comprises a 
structural component that is determined by underlying long-run growth rates of government 
expenditure revenue, and a cyclical component that reflects the response of the operating 
surplus to the business cycle.  In response to unexpected shocks that threaten the viability of 
achieving its desired budget balance, a government can make adjustments to the long-run 
growth rates of government expenditure and revenue.  Alternatively, it can change the 
responsiveness of the fiscal balance to the business cycle.  However, because of the 
￿inside￿ and ￿outside￿ lags, these adjustments cannot be achieved instantaneously.   
 
A further potential complicating issue arises from the fact that as the volatility of the 
government budget balance increases, the probability of breaching a desired lower (or 
upper) bound will increase.  This point is stressed by Tam and Kirkham (2001) who argue 
that the New Zealand government budget balance has tended to be relatively volatile 
compared to many other OECD countries, for two reasons:  New Zealand￿s business cycle 
has been relatively volatile and, the budget balance is relatively sensitive to changes in the 
business cycle.    
 
Therefore, if a government wants to allow automatic fiscal stabilisers to operate unimpeded 
over the business cycle without breaching some lower or upper bound for the fiscal balance 
(such as any bound implied by the Fiscal Responsibility Act), it needs to set fiscal 
parameters and the ex ante budget balance so that they take into account the potential 
impact of unexpected exogenous shocks to the budget balance.  Put another way, to avoid 
breaching a desired budget balance ex post, a government needs to form a judgement 
about the appropriate ex ante budget balance in light of given probabilities of the type and 
size of exogenous shocks that could impact on the structural and cyclical components of the 
budget balance. 
 
The aim of this paper is to develop a procedure for this purpose.  Our approach is to use a 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model to evaluate the probability and impact of 
different types of shocks to a New Zealand government￿s cash budget balance.
3  B y  
examining the magnitude of past shocks, and their effect on the cash budget balance, the 
model is used to estimate the level of the ex ante cash budget surplus necessary to achieve 
a specified cash budget surplus at some future time horizon with a given level of probability.  
Alternative time horizons are considered because, as the future time horizon is extended, 
the probability of adverse disturbances to the cash budget balance increases and their 
propagation effects become more pronounced.  Therefore, for a desired probability of 
continuously avoiding breaching a particular floor (or minimum value) for the cash budget 
surplus, the appropriate ex ante cash budget surplus increases as the time horizon for that 
target is extended. 
 
Various approaches can be used to estimate prudent budgetary margins.  For example, Buti, 
Franco and Ongena (1998) use estimated elasticities of budget deficits to output changes to 
evaluate the distance a budget deficit would need to be from its target in order to 
                                                                                                                                                  
FRA also requires a government to illustrate likely progress towards the objectives in the Fiscal Strategy Report 
(New Zealand Government, 2000)  
 
3 The terms “cash budget balance” and “budget balance” are used interchangeably in the text.  We use the term 
“cash budget balance” to refer to the Crown’s net cash flow from operations, or cash flow generated from its 
day to day (or operating) activities.  The cash budget balance differs from the “operating balance” reported in 
the Crown’s accounts, in that the operating balance is not measured on a cash basis, but is measured on an 
accrual basis.  See Appendix Two for further details.  
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accommodate the impact on the deficit if a country￿s output gap was at its historical 
maximum negative gap.   
 
The New Zealand Treasury uses a number of procedures in the analysis of appropriate 
budgetary margins.  A "Ready Reckoner" model is used to provide indicative fiscal tracks in 
the event of alternative real output growth paths.   For the short term, the Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance (CAB) model is used to gauge the underlying structural fiscal position.  The 
Treasury also uses a Long Term Fiscal Model (LTFM) to project the path of fiscal variables, 
beyond the short-term forecast horizon, under alternative economic and fiscal assumptions.  
The LTFM uses economic assumptions regarding GDP growth, interest rates and 
employment to model the fiscal position.  However, the interaction between these variables 
and the cash budget balance is not captured and formally estimated probabilities are not 
assigned to the cash budget balance forecasts.   
 
This paper augments the existing models of The Treasury, in that the interaction between a 
set of economic variables and the cash budget balance is explicitly modelled.  In addition, 
this paper presents a different approach to the ￿risks and scenarios￿ approach that the 
Treasury undertakes with its set of forecasts
4. Rather than predicting the behaviour of the 
cash budget balance under specific, alternative shocks to the economy, we focus on the 
level of the cash budget balance sufficient to withstand a number of possible shocks and still 
remain within surplus.  In effect, this necessitates forming a judgment on the size and 
frequency of each particular shock to the economy and their impact on the budget balance. 
 
In order to make this judgment, the approach of this paper is to undertake stochastic 
simulations based on SVAR equations that capture the dynamic response of the 
government’s cash budget balance to historical structural disturbances. From this SVAR 
model, we can derive probabilities of breaching particular cash budget balance targets over 
alternative horizons.  The simulation procedure used to derive these probabilities follows the 
method proposed by Dalsgaard and de Serres (1999).  This paper extends their work by 
specifying a theoretical macroeconomic model and budget balance function to underpin the 
SVAR model and to make explicit the theoretical explanations for the structural restrictions 
imposed on the model.   
 
The first step involves specifying a theoretical macro model that explicitly incorporates the 
government￿s budget balance and its interactions with the rest of the economy.  This stage 
involves specifying the variables, identifying restrictions, and exogenous shocks that should 
be captured by the empirical model.  It also provides a theoretical basis for identifying the 
expected short-run and long-run effects of exogenous shocks on the budget balance and 
other endogenous variables in the model. 
   
The second step involves estimation of a structural VAR model to determine the effects of 
exogenous shocks on the cash budget balance and other endogenous variables.  We 
consider four types of exogenous shocks: supply, fiscal, real private demand and domestic 
nominal price shocks.  We compare the short-run and long-run behaviour of the endogenous 
variables in response to these four disturbances as a way of verifying whether the estimated 
SVAR model successfully captures the four disturbances that are identified by the theoretical 
model of the budget balance and the macroeconomy.  
 
The third stage involves stochastic simulations of the estimated SVAR equations to build up 
probabilities of breaching a particular cash budget balance floor over a range of alternative 
future time horizons.   
 
                                                
4 For example, see chapter 3 of The Treasury (2000), Budget Economic and Fiscal Update.  
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2.  A “sticky-price” macroeconomic model and the budget balance 
 
Our interpretation of the type of disturbances that will impinge on the budget balance and 
whether these disturbances will have transitory or permanent effects is based on a traditional 
sticky-price model of macroeconomic fluctuations.  The model is a variant of Fischer￿s (1977) 
sticky-price macroeconomic model.  Modifications introduced to that model are the 
specification of a government budget balance function, a private sector demand function, 
and the explicit treatment of fiscal shocks in the aggregate and private sector demand 
functions.   
 
The model is specified as follows: 
 
0 , , , ; 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 > − + + − = a a a a a a a r a Y t t t t t γ δ θ  (1) 
0 , , ; 3 2 1 3 2 1 > + + − = b b b b r b Y b F t t t t t γ δ  (2) 
0 , , ; 3 2 1 3 2 1 > + + − = d d d d r d Y d D t t t t t δ θ  (3) 
0 , ; 2 1 2 1 > − = − c c r c Y c P M t t t t    (4) 






t t t ε γ γ + = − 1  (6) 
d
t t t ε δ δ + = − 1  (7) 
s
t t t ε θ θ + = − 1  (8) 
n
t t t M M ε + = − 1  (9) 
 
The variables Y, F, and D denote the logs of realised real output, the government￿s real 
budget balance and real private sector demand, respectively.  The natural rate of 
employment is denoted by N , θ  denotes the log of productivity, P and M represent the logs 
of the price level and the money supply respectively, and r is the real interest rate.   
 
Equation (1) is a reduced form IS function that recognises that real aggregate demand is 
determined by the real interest rate and exogenous shocks to total private demand and to 
fiscal policy.   
 
Equation (2) states that the real budget balance comprises four components: a component 
determined by real income, a real interest rate component, and two exogenous shock 
components.  The parameter  0 1 > b  in equation (2) captures the net effect of real output on 
the budget balance arising from the interaction of output and taxation, transfer payments and 
government expenditure.  The parameter  0 2 > b  captures the effect of real interest rates,  
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arising from the need to service public debt.  The two exogenous shocks to the real budget 
balance arise from shocks to private demand (δ ) and fiscal shocks (γ ), which are assumed to 
follow a random walk process. 
 
The inclusion of  t b δ 3  in the real budget function captures the presence of a ‘discretionary’ 
stabilisation role of fiscal policy in response to shocks to private demand, in contrast to the 
‘automatic’ role captured by  t Y b1 .  The reason for this is as follows.  Private demand shocks 
will tend to cause real private demand to deviate from the natural rate of output and hence 
either accentuate inflationary pressures or accentuate the size of the output gap.   
Accordingly, we allow for the possibility of an offsetting (or stabilisation) response by the 
fiscal authority.   
 
The coefficient  0 3 > b  in equation (2) captures this fiscal policy reaction.  It implies that, in 
the presence of a positive real private demand shock, a government will react by increasing 
the fiscal surplus, thereby moderating the rise in aggregate demand as a consequence of 
the real private demand shock.  Similarly, a negative private demand shock, which will have 
the potential to increase the output gap and unemployment, is assumed to provoke the 
converse reaction by a government.  In this case, a government will reduce the fiscal surplus 
with the aim of moderating the decline in real aggregate demand relative to the natural rate 
of output. 
 
Equation (3) states that aggregate real private demand is a function of realised real income 
(Y), the real interest rate (r), productivity and exogenous changes in real private demand (δ ).  
Productivity is allowed to affect aggregate private demand directly.  This could occur through 
investment demand for example, in which case  0 3 > d .   
 
Equation (4) is the demand for real money balances.  M is assumed to follow a random walk 
process.   
 
Equation (5) is the production function; it relates output, employment, and productivity.   
Y can be interpreted as the natural rate of output which is the rate of output that is realised 
when employment is at the natural rate, given the level of productivity, θ , which is assumed 




d ε , 
s ε , 
n ε  are serially uncorrelated and orthogonal fiscal, private 
demand, supply (or productivity) and nominal disturbances, respectively.  
 
This model can be reduced to a four equation system by using equation (4) to derive an 
expression for the real interest rate (r) and eliminating it from equations (2) and (3).  The 
result is a four-equation system for Y, F, D and Y , where the new coefficients ( i y ,  i f  and 
i z ) are complex functions of the original coefficients ( i a ,  i b ,  i c , and  i d ): 
 
t t t t t t y y y P M y Y γ δ θ 4 3 2 1 ) ( − + + − =  (10) 
t t t t t t f P M f Y f F γ δ + + − + = 3 2 1 ) (  (11) 
t t t t t t z P M z Y z D δ θ + + − + = 3 2 1 ) (  (12) 
t t N Y θ + =    (13)  
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The model assumes that monopolistic firms set prices for period t at the end of period t-1 at 
a level that is expected to make the quantity demanded equal the to natural rate of output, 
ie. to achieve  0 ) ( E 1 = − − t t t Y Y .  This is used to solve for  t Y ,  t F ,  t D  and  t P .  The solutions 
for these endogenous variables imply the following growth paths for real output, the real 
budget balance, real aggregate private demand and prices:  
 














t t y y y Y − − − − − + − − − + = ∆ ε ε ε ε ε ε ε  




t y − − + ε ε  (14) 
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= ∆ ε ε ε ε  (17) 
 
 
In this form, the model implies five long-run restrictions: three in equation (14) and one in 
each of equations (15) and (16).  The presence of nominal price rigidities in the short run 
means the model predicts that positive real private demand disturbances (
d ε ) and nominal 
disturbances (
n ε ) will raise real output in the short run, but these effects disappear in the 
long run.  Similarly, positive fiscal shocks (
f ε ) will lower real output in the short run, but the 
effect disappears in the long run.  In the long run, only supply (that is, productivity) 
disturbances (
s ε ) affect output.   
 
However, the long-run effect of real private demand shocks on the real budget balance in 





f −  is less than or greater 
than zero.  3 f  is the direct effect of private demand shocks on the real budget balance 





 is the indirect effect of 
private demand shocks on the budget balance arising from consequential changes in real 




It is not clear which of these two influences dominate.  Moreover, it is unrealistic to allow the 
real budget balance to change permanently in response to real private demand shocks.   
Therefore we will assume the total long-run effect is zero.  Accordingly, this leaves us with 
six long-run restrictions that are imposed on the SVAR model specified in section 3.    
 
The short-run and long-run response of real output, the fiscal balance, real private demand 
and inflation to the four disturbances implied by this theoretical dynamic model are 
summarised in Table 1. 
 
The model predicts that in the short run the budget balance will rise in response to positive 
supply, real private demand and nominal shocks.  The short-run response to fiscal shocks is 
unclear because there are offsetting forces arising from the direct impact on the budget 
balance of a fiscal shock and the induced fall in real output that lowers net taxation revenue.  
It seems likely however that  4 1y f <1, in which case a positive fiscal shock will raise the 
budget balance in the short run.  In the long run, supply and fiscal shocks permanently affect 
the budget balance while real private demand and nominal shocks are neutral.   
 
Positive supply, real private demand and nominal shocks raise real private demand in the 
short run.  The impact of positive fiscal shocks on real private demand is negative.  This 
occurs because a positive fiscal shock lowers real aggregate demand and realised output, 
which in turn reduces real private demand.   
 
In the long run, the response of real private demand to positive supply shocks and real 
demand shocks is ambiguous, because there is a positive impact of these shocks on private 
demand, but there is also a possible negative effect arising from a fall in real money 
balances and a rise in the real interest rate.  The long-run effect of positive fiscal shocks is 
positive via the ￿crowding in￿ effect of a fall in real interest rates.  The long-run impact of 
nominal shocks on real private demand is neutral, even though these are random walk 
shocks, ie. permanent shocks.  The reason for this is that the price level changes, so that 
real money balances are unchanged in the long run.   
 
The model therefore incorporates a dichotomy between the long-run effects of demand and 
supply shocks.  While this is common practice, there are many reasons to think that demand 
and fiscal disturbances could have long-run effects on output.  These include the presence 
of increasing returns, of learning by doing, and the possibility that fiscal policy may affect the 
savings rate, and subsequently the long-run capital stock.   
 
Despite these possibilities, it is common practice to assume these long-run effects are small 
compared to those of supply disturbances.  Thus, distinguishing between the long-run 
effects of real demand, nominal and fiscal shocks and the long-run effects of supply shocks 
has important implications for their related long-run effects on real private demand, inflation 
and the budget balance. 
 
 
3.  Specification of the structural VAR model 
 
In this section, we construct and estimate a four variable structural VAR model in order to 
decompose fluctuations in the government budget balance into the four structural (or 
economic) disturbances identified in the model described in section 2, i.e., 
s ε , 
f ε , 
d ε , and 




The model can be represented by a  1 4×  vector of endogenous variables  Z ∆  (comprising 
∆ Y, ∆ F, ∆ D, and ∆ P) with the moving average representation given by 
 
t t L A Z ε ) ( = ∆ , (18) 
 






) ( L A L A A L A L A
s
s
s  is a  4 4×  matrix of polynomials in the lag 
operator L and  t ε  is a  1 4×  vector of white noise disturbance terms 
s ε , 
f ε , 
d ε , and 
n ε . 
We assume that  0 A  has 1￿s along its diagonal and that  ) , 0 ( ~ ε ε Σ t  and  ε Σ  is diagonal (that 
is, the structural shocks are mutually orthogonal).  The variables in  Z ∆  are all stationary. (If 
any of the variables are non-stationary, it should be further differenced to make it stationary 
provided the variables are not cointegrated).  The  t ε ￿s are structural disturbances, and we 
are interested in estimating the response of elements of Z to innovations in the elements of 
ε .  For example, we are interested in the response of the budget balance to four different 
structural disturbances. A plot of the row i, column j element of  s A  as a function of s is called 
the impulse response function.  It describes the response of  s it Z + ∆  to a one-time one-unit 
impulse in  jt ε . 
 
It is convenient to define the matrix H such that  ε Σ = ′ H H ; the diagonal elements of H are 
the standard errors of the elements of ε .  Then equation (18) can be rewritten as 
 
t t t t L A HH L A L A Z ε ε ε ~ ) ( ~ ) ( ) (
1 = = = ∆
− , (19) 
 
where  H L A L A ) ( ) ( ~ = , and  t t H ε ε
1 ~ − =  is the vector of structural shocks measured in one 
standard deviation units.  Note that 
 
  I ) ( ) )( E )( ( ~ ~ E
1 1 1 1 = ′ ′ = ′ ′ = ′
− − − − H H H H H H t t t t ε ε ε ε .   
 
The  ij-th element of  s A ~
 represents the response of  s it Z + ∆  to a one-time one standard 
deviation impulse in  jt ε . 
 
One way to summarise the information contained in our  Z ∆  data is to estimate the VAR 
representation of appropriate order k: 
 
t t u Z L B = ∆ ) ( , where 
k
kL B L B L B I L B − − − − = L
2
2 1 ) ( . (20) 
 
Since  Z ∆  is stationary, the roots of  ) (L B  are all greater than 1.  Therefore the VAR 
representation can be inverted into  t t u L C Z ) ( = ∆ , where 
1 ) ( ) (
− = L B L C  and  I C = ) 0 ( .  In 
terms of (13), 
1 ) 0 ( ) ( ) (
− = A L A L C  and  t t A u ε ) 0 ( = .  Thus in order to recover estimates of 
the structural disturbances,  t ε , from the estimated VAR residuals,  t u , it is necessary to 
estimate  ) 0 ( A . 
 
The covariance matrix of the VAR residuals,  u Σ , is related to  ) 0 ( A  and  ε Σ  by  




Since  u Σ  is symmetrical, equation (21) provides  2 / ) 1 ( + n n restrictions, where n is equal to 
four.  But we have to estimate 
2 n  elements in  ) 0 ( A  and H. Therefore, 
2 / ) 1 ( 2 / ) 1 (
2 − = + − n n n n n  additional restrictions are necessary for complete identification.  
For the four variable system we consider, six additional restrictions are required.  
 
Such identifying restrictions have taken a variety of forms in the literature.  One approach 
achieves identification by imposing a priori restrictions on the contemporaneous interactions 
among the variables in the system. These restrictions take the form of exclusion restrictions 
i.e., zero restrictions on some of the elements of  ) 0 ( A .  These include the recursive 
structure popularised by Sims (1986) and the simultaneous equations approach by 
Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986), and Blanchard (1989).  
 
An alternative approach to identification relies on restrictions on long-run effects implied by 
an underlying theoretical model. As shown by Blanchard and Quah (1989), this can be 
translated into a restriction on the dynamic system that may aid in the identification of model 
parameters. 
 
The lag polynomial  ) (L C  that is obtained by inverting the VAR representation is defined by  
 
) ( ) 0 ( ) ( L A A L C = . (22) 
 
Assume that economic theory implies that certain structural disturbances have no long-run 
impact on some elements of Z .  This imposes zero restrictions on the elements of  ) 1 ( A .  In 
this case, the restrictions imposed by  
 
) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( A A C =  (23) 
 
together with restrictions implied by (21) may allow  ) 0 ( A  to be estimated.
5  This is the 
approach taken by Blanchard and Quah (1989). Examples of the application of long-run 
identifying restrictions to estimate SVAR models for the New Zealand macroeconomy are 
Conway (1998), Fisher (1996) and Fisher, Fackler and Orden (1995).  Some studies like Gali 
(1992) apply combinations of contemporaneous and long-run restrictions by imposing zero 
restrictions on some of the elements of both  ) 0 ( A  and  ) 1 ( A .   
 
In this paper, only long-run restrictions are imposed.  This allows the data to determine the 
short-run dynamics.  The theoretical model developed in Section 2 suggests it may be 
appropriate to impose restrictions on the contemporaneous reaction of prices to structural 
disturbances.  However, the model is estimated using annual data and, although goods 
prices would be expected to display inertia, according to recent research the duration of 
prices is typically significantly less than one year.  Buckle and Carlson (1995) estimate the 
average duration of prices set by NZ manufacturing, building, merchant and service firms 
was approximately 4.7 months during the high inflation in the 1970s and 1980s and was 
approximately 8.5 months during the 1990s when inflation was much lower.   
 
The long-run restrictions are as follows.  Three restrictions arise because fiscal, real private 
demand, and nominal shocks do not have permanent effects on real output, but supply 
shocks can have a permanent effect. Two further restrictions are that real private demand 
shocks and nominal shocks do not have long-run effects on the government budget balance.   
                                                
5 If  L + + + =
2
2 1 0 ) ( L A L A A L A , then  L + + + = 2 1 0 ) 1 ( A A A A  equals the sum of the lag coefficients.  
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The sixth restriction is that nominal shocks have a permanent effect on the aggregate price 
level but do not have a permanent effect on any other variable in the system. These long-run 
restrictions imply that 
 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 34 24 23 14 13 12 = = = = = = a a a a a a , (24) 
 
where  ) (L aij  is the ij-th element of  ) (L A .  This provides us with six restrictions, which is just 














) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 0 0 ) 1 (










which is lower triangular.  Noting that  t t A u C ε ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = , where  ) 1 ( C  is the matrix of estimated 
long-run multipliers from the VAR, 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ′ ′ = ′ Σ = ′ Σ A H H A A A C C u ε . 
 
Since  ) 1 ( C  and  u Σ  are available from the estimation of a standard VAR representation, the 
estimate of the lower triangular matrix  H A A ) 1 ( ) 1 (
~
=  can be obtained as the Cholesky factor 
of  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ′ Σ C C u .  Once  ) 1 (
~
A  is estimated, the estimate of  H A A ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ~ =  is obtained from 




− .  Since the diagonal elements of  ) 0 ( A  equal 1, we can recover 
estimates of  ) 0 ( A  and P from an estimate of  ) 0 ( ~ A . 
 
 
4.  Data, model estimation and impulse responses 
 
To estimate the SVAR system, data were required for the four endogenous variables: real 
output, the real government budget balance, real private demand, and the general price 
level.  The annual data used to estimate the model included: 
 
Y: Log of real GDP;  
F: Central Government’s net cash flows from operations as a ratio to nominal 
GDP
6; 
D: Log of the sum of real private consumption and real private investment; 
P: GDP deflator. 
 
The longest sample period available was 1971 ￿ 1999.  Details of the data and their sources 
are described in Appendix One.  Y, D and P are available on a March year basis throughout 
the sample period whereas F is only available on a March year basis until 1989, thereafter it 
is measured on a June year basis.  An in-built lag between F and the other three 
endogenous variables will therefore already partially exist.   This should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the impulse responses.  Whether these four variables are 
                                                
6 As we define our real budget balance variable to be the nominal net cash flow from operations as a ratio to 
nominal GDP, hereafter the term “real budget balance” will refer to the ratio specified above.  
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In order for the methodology described in Section 3 to be valid, all the variables included in 
the SVAR system should be stationary.  If a variable is non-stationary, it should be 
differenced until it becomes stationary. The time series of the four variables are depicted in 
Figure 1.  The results of formal Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests are reported 
in Table 2.
7  For real output, the real budget balance and real private demand in level form, 
and for the first difference of the GDP deflator, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root.  In each case, however, first differencing of the real variables and second 




While the preceding test suggests that the variables are nonstationary in level form when 
considered individually, it is possible that these variables share a common nonstationary 
trend.  In this case, a stationary linear combination of the variables may be found, and the 
variables are said to be cointegrated.  When variables are cointegrated, estimating a SVAR 
model where the series are expressed in first differences would be inappropriate.  One 
reason is that first-differencing would remove important information about the behaviour of 
the variables contained in the common trend.  
 
We checked for the possibility that the four-variable system might be cointegrated.  Vector 
cointegrating regressions do not indicate stationary residuals using the ADF test suggested 
by Engle and Granger (1987)
8.  In particular, the ADF statistics from the levels regression 
normalised to either real GDP, the real budget balance, private real demand, or the inflation 
rate are ￿2.40, ￿2.81, ￿2.42, ￿2.71 respectively. The 5 percent critical value is ￿ 4.22. 
 




Lag order determination constitutes a well-known problem when it comes to implementing a 
SVAR model.  Whether a time trend should be included as a deterministic component also 
needs to be considered. Typically the issue is handled by performing likelihood ratio tests.  
However, we have an extremely small sample size.  The likelihood ratio test is based on 
asymptotic theory, which may not be useful for the small sample size of this study.  Instead, 
we used multivariate generalisations of the Akaike Information Criterion and Hannan Quinn 
Information Criterion.  
 
Table 3 reports the values of these criteria for different model specifications.  Both criteria 
select a model that includes 3 lags in the VAR, with a time trend.  Therefore, the impulse 
responses and stochastic simulation results reported below are based on a SVAR model 
that incorporates three lags and a time trend.  
 
                                                
7 Our data set runs from 1971 to 1999 and covers a period in which there may have been structural changes to 
the New Zealand economy.  If so, there may be an argument to use Perron’s test for unit roots in the presence of 
structural change.  However, the small sample size, means it is not feasible to adopt this approach.   
8  The Johansen (1988) method is another way by which the possibility of cointegration can be checked.   
However, that procedure is based on the maximum likelihood method which may not be reliable in view of the 





Impulse responses from the VAR estimation are presented in Figure 2.  Since no restrictions 
other than the six long-run identifying restrictions are imposed on the effects of the shocks, it 
is possible to check whether the identified shocks behave in a way which is consistent with 
the implications of the theory discussed in Section 2.  Most of the effects match the 
implications of the theory summarised in Table 1. 
 
The real budget balance responds to the four disturbances in the estimated model in a 
manner consistent with our theoretical model, with the exception of the immediate reaction to 
a nominal shock.  It is worth noting that a positive supply shock raises the budget balance in 
the short run and in the long run.  The short-run reaction of the fiscal balance to supply 
shocks could in fact be consistent with the theoretical model.  Note that, since the rise in 
GDP is greater than the rise in the budget balance, the real budget balance (which is the 
ratio of the budget balance to GDP) falls in the short run and in the long run, as Figure 2 
illustrates.   
 
Turning to the other components of our model, the reactions of real output, real private 
demand and inflation are for the most part consistent with our theoretical model.  Real output 
responds positively in the short run to positive supply, real private demand and nominal 
shocks.  The positive supply shocks generate the expected positive long-run effects on real 
output and the impact of real private demand and nominal shocks on real output disappear 
in the long run.  Similarly, the impact of fiscal shocks on real output disappear in the long 
run.  In the short run however, positive fiscal shocks raise real output, which is not a result 
anticipated by our theoretical model. 
 
Real private demand rises in the short run and in the long run in response to positive supply 
and positive real private demand shocks.  The short-run reactions are consistent with the 
theoretical model. The long￿run reactions are also consistent since the signs for the 
theoretical model are ambiguous. The long-run reaction of real private demand to nominal 
shocks is neutral which is also consistent with the theoretical model.  The immediate 
response of real private demand in response to a positive fiscal shock is positive, which is 
not predicted by the theoretical model.  The long-run effects, although small, are positive 
which is consistent with the theoretical model.   
 
The long-run reactions of inflation to positive supply, real private demand and nominal 
shocks are consistent with our theoretical model results.  According to our theoretical model, 
the long-run reaction of inflation to a positive productivity shock depends on two opposing 
forces.  Productivity has an ambiguous effect on inflation because it can induce a change in 
real output and a change in real demand.  The rise in demand could be direct (via the 
reaction of investment to the rise in productivity) and indirect as a result of the rise in real 
output inducing further increases in real private demand.  Figure 2 shows that in the short 
run, inflation falls in response to a positive supply shock (implying the supply effect 
dominates in the short run) but rises in the long run (implying the direct and induced demand 
effects dominate in the long run.)   
 
Our theoretical model also implies that, due to prices being set one period ahead, there will 
be no immediate reaction of actual prices to any of the former disturbances.  The SVAR 
impulse responses show however an immediate change of inflation in response to all four 
shocks.    
 
There are at least two possible reasons for this result.  First, the data are likely be capturing 
the fact that not all prices are necessarily rigid in the short run.  Second, as explained in 
Section 3, even if most prices are sticky in the short run the average duration of prices for 
many types of output in New Zealand is significantly shorter than one year (which is the  
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frequency of the data used to estimate the SVAR model).  Accordingly, impulse responses 
based on annual data could be expected to reveal significant price reactions even if many 
prices are preset.   
 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
 
The relative importance of the contribution of the four shocks to the variance of each 
endogenous variable can be deduced by decomposing the forecast error variance.  Table 4 
provides this information and it reveals some interesting results.   
 
In the short run, supply shocks and fiscal shocks account for most of the variance of real 
GDP.  Because of the long-run identifying restriction, the relative importance of fiscal shocks 
declines as the forecasting horizon increases.  Supply, fiscal and real demand shocks each 
contribute about one-third of the variance of real private demand in the short run.  The 
contribution of fiscal and real demand shocks is smaller in the long run.  Supply shocks are 
the dominant source of variation in real private demand in the long run.  The variance of 
inflation is dominated by nominal shocks in the short run and long run, although the 
importance of supply shocks increases in the long run. 
 
Particularly interesting is the large contribution of fiscal shocks to the variance of the budget 
balance in the short run and long run.  In the short run they contribute about two-thirds of the 
explanation for the variance of the real budget balance and supply shocks contribute a little 
under a third.  Real private demand and nominal shocks have a negligible influence on the 
variance of the budget balance.  In the long run, over 80 percent of the variance in the real 
budget balance is explained by fiscal shocks.   
 
 
5.  Stochastic simulations and implied budget targets 
 
The SVAR model satisfactorily captures key properties of the theoretical macro model.  The 
model can therefore be used to generate stochastic simulations to assess the risk of 
breaching an ex post real budget balance target over different time horizons.  Each 
stochastic simulation generates a hypothetical path for the four variables of the model. 
These hypothetical paths are functions of two determinants: structural disturbances to the 
economy and the propagation mechanism of the economy.  
 
The process of using the SVAR analysis of historical data to specify those determinants and 
generate these simulated paths is similar to the process used by Dalsgaard and de Serres 
(1999).  This process involves the following steps: 
 
1.  Assuming that the structural shocks to the economy are distributed as  ) , 0 ( ε Σ N .  That 
is, structural shocks are mutually independent and are normally distributed.  The 
estimate of  ε Σ  is obtained from the SVAR estimation explained in section 3;   
 
2.  Replacing the third diagonal element of  ε Σ  with zero in the first simulation so that the 
variance of the fiscal shock is identically equal to zero. This is to exclude autonomous 
changes in the real budget balance and to capture the pure effects from induced 
changes to the real budget balance.  These results are shown in Figure 3; 
 
3.  Incorporating autonomous changes in the real budget balance in the second simulation 




4.  Assuming that the propagation mechanism of the economy is captured by the estimate 
of  ) (L A  obtained from the SVAR estimation. 
 
Once the distribution of fundamental shocks and the propagation mechanism of the 
economy are specified, the stochastic simulation is done through the following steps: 
 
1.  Values of simulated structural shocks are drawn randomly, at each time period, from 
their distribution. 
 
2.  The simulated time series of structural shocks, together with the assumed initial values 
of the variables, are fed into the non-deterministic part of the estimated SVAR system. 
This generates hypothetical time paths for the four variables.  The initial values for all 
variables are taken to be zero because the procedure simulates the non-deterministic 
components of the model i.e., the stochastic components which have a mean value of 
zero.
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3.  Large numbers (in this case we used 1000) of simulated data sets are generated by 
repeating steps 1 and 2.  
 
4.  For each simulated path of the real budget balance, find the minimum value during a 
particular time horizon considered. 
 
5.  These minimum values are ranked in ascending order to form a distribution for each time 
horizon. 
 
6.  Percentiles calculated from this distribution are used to assign a confidence level that the 
minimum real budget balance will be reached during that time horizon. For example, the 
10
th percentile in the distribution can be interpreted as the minimum real budget balance 
that may be reached with a 90 per cent confidence level. 
 
7.  For each confidence interval, if the relevant percentile breaches the specified lower 
bound by say x%, the initial value of the real budget balance is adjusted upward by x%.  
This adjusted initial value of the real budget balance is the ex ante real budget surplus 
required for not breaching the specified lower bound at a given confidence interval during 
the time horizon considered. 
 
8.  Steps 4, 5, 6, and 7 are repeated for various time horizons. 
 
This procedure is equivalent to simulating the response of the non-deterministic or stochastic 
component of the fiscal balance.  The reason is that the simulations show how various 
macroeconomic shocks are propagated into the stochastic component of the fiscal balance.  
Accordingly, the simulations show how the budget balance would fluctuate around its trend 
value in response to unexpected shocks.  Therefore, the simulations provide a basis for 
determining the size of the buffer required in order to avoid unexpected shocks driving the 
budget balance below some specified lower bound. 
 
The first simulations exclude autonomous changes in the real budget balance.  This 
procedure assumes that while supply, private demand and nominal shocks are assumed to 
be independent of fiscal policy, fiscal shocks are at the discretion of Government.  The 
results for different time horizons and levels of confidence are shown in Figure 3.  They can 
be interpreted as follows.  Suppose the fiscal target the government wishes to achieve with 
95 percent confidence is a lower bound of zero for the real budget balance.  According to 
                                                
9 This means that the results are not dependent on the stage of the business cycle.  
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Figure 3, the average annual ex ante budget balance for New Zealand should therefore be 
set at a surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP if the fiscal planning horizon is one year.  As the 
planning horizon is extended to two years the appropriate average annual ex ante surplus 
rises to approximately 1.8 percent of GDP, for three years it rises to 2 percent of GDP, and 
for a five-year horizon it increases to about 2.3 percent of GDP.
10 
 
The appropriate ex ante budget surplus increases as the planning horizon increases 
because the probability of adverse shocks to the real budget balance increases and the 
propagation process becomes more pronounced as the planning horizon is extended 
outward.  Similarly, as the desired probability of not breaching a lower bound for the budget 
balance is raised, the appropriate ex ante budget surplus is increased. 
 
These results for New Zealand are comparable to results obtained by Dalsgaard and de 
Serres (1999) who used a similar procedure to estimate appropriate budget targets for 
several EU countries. The purpose of their exercise was to determine the budget balance 
target that would ensure, at a given probability, that the three percent deficit limit required by 
the Maastricht Treaty was not breached over a particular time horizon.  
 
By appropriate scaling of the Dalsgaard and de Serres results we can deduce their implied 
ex ante budget surpluses required to ensure, for a given confidence level, that a zero lower 
bound for the budget balance is not breached.  For example, the results estimated for the 
UK using bi-annual data for the period 1965 to 1996 and for a 95 percent confidence level 
are approximately: 2 percent for a one-year planning horizon; 3.5 percent for a three-year 
planning horizon; and 4 percent for a five-year horizon.  Corresponding results for Germany 
(estimated using data from 1961 to 1997) are: 1.8 percent for a one-year planning horizon; 2 
percent for a three-year planning horizon; and 2.5 percent for a five-year horizon.  For 
Austria (estimated using data from 1966 to 1995): 1.5 percent for a one-year planning 
horizon; 2.2 percent for a three-year planning horizon; and 2.5 percent for a five-year 
horizon. 
 
Our results can also be used to derive the probability that the net cash flows from operations 
forecast by governments, such as in the Budget Economic and Fiscal Update, will not 
breach a zero floor.  For example, the forecast for the net cash flow from operations for the 
year ended June 2001 is NZ$1,089 million or approximately 1.0 percent of GDP.  From 
Figure 3, this cash flow has an approximately 85 percent probability of not breaching a zero 
floor for the year to June 2001.  The ex ante forecast for the net cash flow from operations 
for the year to June 2002 is NZ$2,351 million or approximately 2.0 percent of GDP.  This 
implies that the mean net cash flow from operations for the two years to June 2002 is 
approximately 1.5 percent of GDP [i.e., (1 + 2)/2].  Figure 3 indicates therefore that on the 
basis of the current budget forecasts for the two years to June 2002, there is approximately 
a 90 percent probability that the average annual net cash flow from operations will not be 
less than zero for the two-year period.   
 
The second set of simulations incorporates fiscal shocks and therefore it includes 
autonomous changes in the real budget balance. The forecast error variance decomposition 
shown in Table 4 showed that the presence of fiscal shocks was the dominant explanation of 
the variance for the real budget balance.  We can therefore expect the inclusion of fiscal 
shocks to have a significant influence on the ex ante budget balance targets compared to 
those derived in the first simulations, which excluded fiscal shocks.  The results for different 
time horizons and levels of confidence are shown in Figure 4.  They confirm our expectation. 
                                                
10 The different time horizons are in reference to the duration of time under which the corresponding simulation 
is performed.  For example, if the planning horizon is 2 years, an ex ante budget surplus of 1.8 percent of GDP 
means that the average annual balance should be 1.8 percent for the two-year period.   It does not mean that the 




The probability that the net cash flow from operations forecast by governments will not 
breach a zero floor, when fiscal shocks are included, can be deduced from Figure 4.  The 
inclusion of a fiscal shock lowers the probability of not breaching a zero floor. Without fiscal 
shocks, Figure 3 implied there was an 85 percent probability of the net cash flow from 
operations for the year ended June 2001 not breaching a zero floor.  With fiscal shocks 
included, Figure 4 implies that this probability is now 69 percent.  Figure 3 also suggested 
that there was a 90 percent probability of the net cash flow from operations for the two years 
to June 2002 not breaching a zero floor.  Figure 4 suggests this probability falls to 66 percent 
when fiscal shocks are included.   
 
The acceptability of incorporating fiscal shocks will depend, as is assumed for the other 
shocks, on whether past unexplained fiscal changes are likely to be representative of the 
type of fiscal shocks that could occur in the future.  The introduction of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994 may render that assumption invalid if it has significantly changed the 
way in which fiscal policy decisions are made.   
 
Incorporating fiscal shocks generates substantially larger ex ante budget balance targets 
required to avoid a budget deficit for a given level of probability.   For example, by including 
fiscal shocks, the ex ante budget balance required to avoid a budget deficit at 95 percent 
level of confidence over a one-year planning horizon, increases from a surplus of 1.5 percent 
of GDP to over 3 percent of GDP.  For a two-year horizon, the ex ante surplus increases 
from approximately 1.8 percent of GDP to 4 percent of GDP and for a five-year horizon it 





This paper endeavours to tackle a practical fiscal management problem.  If government 
wants to allow automatic fiscal stabilisers to operate unimpeded over some specified future 
time horizon (such as the length of a business cycle for example) without breaching some 
lower or upper bound for the fiscal balance (such as any bound implied by the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act for example), it needs to set fiscal parameters and the ex ante budget 
balance to take into account the potential impact of possible future exogenous shocks to the 
budget balance.  This paper develops a procedure for identifying the probability of future 
shocks to the budget balance, their impact on the budget balance, and the size of the ex 
ante budget balance that will satisfy that requirement. 
 
The approach used in this paper is to estimate a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
model of components of the New Zealand economy and the fiscal balance to quantify the 
likelihood of different shocks to the economy, based on the last 30 years experience, and to 
give an overall assessment of the ex ante cash budget position that should be targeted, in 
order to absorb potential shocks without breaching a particular lower bound for the budget 
balance.  The size of the ex ante budget cash position will depend on the fiscal planning 
horizon and on how certain the policy maker wishes to be that potential shocks will be able 
to be absorbed without breaching the specified lower bound.  It will also obviously depend on 
the specified size of the lower (or upper) bound for the budget balance.   
 
The degree of certainty is based on the frequency and magnitude of past supply, fiscal, real 
private demand and nominal shocks to the New Zealand economy, and the historical 
responses of macroeconomic variables to these shocks.  There are several potential 
directions in which this paper could be further developed that may improve the accuracy of 
identifying the probability of shocks, their impact on the budget balance, and the appropriate  
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ex ante fiscal stance.  These include a more explicit treatment of open economy features, 
separation of the government expenditure and revenue components of the budget balance 
function, and the inclusion of a government debt function that interacts with the budget 
balance function.   
 
A significant step involved in estimating the model in this paper was the derivation of a 
consistent long-term series for the central government budget balance.  This work is 
discussed in Appendix Two.  Similar data problems will need to be overcome before we can 
incorporate separate government expenditure, revenue and debt functions.  In view of the 
importance of fiscal shocks in explaining the past variance of the budget balance (shown in 
Table 4) and the likelihood of significant differences in the dynamic impact of government 
expenditure and revenue changes, this would seem to a priority for future work on this topic. 
Furthermore, appropriate inclusion of the stock-flow relationship between budget balances 
and public debt may suggest a different modelling approach to that used in this paper. 
 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 specifies that operating surpluses must be run to reach a 
prudent level of debt, and then to maintain that prudent level of debt.  Although this paper 
has primarily concentrated on the level of the ex ante budget balance necessary to ensure 
the ex post budget balance is not less than zero, the results can be applied to any lower or 
upper bound simply by appropriate scaling.  This paper does not attempt to determine the 
appropriate lower bound for the budget balance.  Nor does it attempt to determine the 
optimal level of public debt or public debt to GDP ratio.   These are issues for further 
research.  In an operational sense, this paper assists the policy maker to specify the 
appropriate ex ante budget balance, once a desired lower bound for the ex post budget 
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Appendix One:  Data description and source 
 
 
Year  GDP RGDP  NCFO  CI  GDP 
deflator 
1971  5,832 50,653 281 38,739  0.12 
1972  6,871 51,942 293 38,864  0.13 
1973  7,887 54,244 230 42,293  0.15 
1974  9,181 58,136 334 46,593  0.16 
1975  10,107  60,479 346 48,452  0.17 
1976  11,712  61,497 107 47,291  0.19 
1977  14,162  61,586 404 46,365  0.23 
1978  14,970  59,992 331 44,271  0.25 
1979  16,958 60,115 -356 44,439  0.28 
1980  19,795  61,649 -90 46,153 0.32 
1981  22,992 62,312 -535 45,905  0.37 
1982  27,891 65,374 -586 48,300  0.43 
1983  31,409 65,793 -929 47,670  0.48 
1984 34,839  67,595 -1,706 49,358  0.52 
1985 39,346  70,929 -1,386 52,501  0.55 
1986  45,282 71,476 -361 53,120  0.63 
1987 54,725  72,973 -1,010 54,777  0.75 
1988  61,641 73,275 -396 56,778  0.84 
1989  66,454 72,989 -164 57,083  0.91 
1990  70,773 73,607 -332 58,180  0.96 
1991 72,248  73,174 -1,861 57,196  0.99 
1992 72,278  72,278 -2,021 54,935  1.00 
1993 74,578  73,124 -1,201 55,710  1.02 
1994  80,824 77,740 1,259 59,727  1.04 
1995  86,556 81,920 3,490 64,733  1.06 
1996  91,461 85,016 4,233 68,468  1.08 
1997  94,940 87,211 2,720 71,272  1.09 
1998  98,025 88,949 1,803 72,955  1.10 
1999  98,913  88,923 392 73,692  1.11 
 
GDP   = Nominal GDP (NZ$m), March year, production based; Statistics NZ.  
RGDP  =  Real GDP (NZ$m), March year, production based, 1991/2 prices;  
    PC Infos, Statistics NZ, series SNBA.S2AZAT. 
NCFO   =  New Zealand central government net cash flow from operations  
      (NZ$m), March year up until 1989, June year from 1990 to 1999.  
      See Appendix Two. 
CI      =  Sum of real private consumption (C) and real private investment,  
      (I) (NZ$m), March year. C is from Dalziel and Lattimore (1999),  
      Data appendix p. 126, updated with PC Infos, Statistics New  
      Zealand, series SNBA.S3AG.  I is from Dalziel and Lattimore  
      (1999), Data appendix p. 127, updated with series constructed from  
      data from PC Infos, Statistics New Zealand, series SNBA.S3AI,  
      SNBA.SDB, SNBA.SDC, SNBA.SDD.   




Appendix Two:  Derivation of the fiscal balance variable 
 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 states that a government must achieve operating 
surpluses every year until a prudent level of debt is achieved.  The emphasis on ￿operating 
surplus,￿ implies a government must attain surpluses from its regular, day to day activities.  
Sales of assets and capital spending are not classified as being part of the Crown￿s 
operating activities.  Hence, although a government can reduce debt from the sale of assets, 
this inflow of funds does not preclude the need to run an operating surplus if it is to satisfy 
the requirements of the Fiscal Responsibility Act.     
 
The Crown￿s operating results are presented in the Statement of Financial Performance, 
which summarises revenue earned and expenses incurred by the Crown.  The difference 
between total revenue and total expenses, plus the net surplus from state-owned enterprises 
and Crown entities, is the operating balance for the period.  The operating balance is 
calculated in compliance with generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP), and is thus 
produced on an accrual basis.  That is, transactions involving revenue and expenses are 
recorded when they occur, rather than when the resulting cash flow occurs.  It could 
therefore be argued that an accrual basis for reporting results in a more complete picture of 
the underlying fiscal position, especially if significant variations occur in the timing of cash 
receipts and payments.  
 
The New Zealand Treasury has only calculated the operating balance since 1992.  This is 
due to the change to the accrual basis of accounting on 1 July 1991.  Prior to this date, all 
transactions were measured using the cash basis of accounting.   Calculating a consistent 
measure of the operating balance on an accrual basis prior to 1992 is not feasible, because 
of the significant differences in the bases of accounting for transactions.  Indeed, the format 
of the Crown￿s Financial Statements prior to the adoption of accrual accounting was very 
different.  The current three core financial statements, the Statement of Financial 
Performance, Statement of Financial Position, and Statement of Cash Flows, were not 
prepared.  Budget tables were primarily focused on calculating the cash deficit or surplus 
before borrowing transactions (the Table 2 balance).  However, since the net cash flow from 
operations has been published in the Crown￿s Financial Statements since the change in 
accounting policy in 1991, it is possible to derive a cash based measure of the Crown’s 
operating balance for the entire sample period since 1971. 
 
Therefore, the choice of fiscal variable for the purposes of this paper is the net cash flow 
from operations.  While the operating balance is an accrual measure of the surplus from the 
Crown￿s operations, net cash flows from operations is a cash measure of the surplus from 
the Crown￿s operations.  A reconciliation of the operating balance and net cash flows from 
operations is provided in the Crown￿s Financial Statements. 
 
The main items in the reconciliation are for items that are included in the operating balance, 
but not in net cash flows from operations.  These items include valuation changes (such as 
unrealised net foreign exchange gains), physical asset movements (specifically depreciation 
and the loss on sale of physical assets) and movements in working capital.     
 
The earlier Table 2 balance, the deficit or surplus before borrowing, included flows of funds 
resulting from the Crown￿s investing activities and some financing activities, in addition to its 
operating activities.  To obtain net cash flows from operations, it is necessary to exclude the 




Relationship between Table 2 balance and net cash flows from operations 
Deficit/surplus before borrowing (Table 2 balance) 
Add: Lending minus repayments  
Equals: Adjusted Financial Balance
11 
Less: Items included in adjusted financial balance but not in net cash flows from operations 
  Sale of physical assets 
  Less: Purchase of physical assets 
Equals: Net cash flow from operations 
 
The table above shows the derivation of the net cash flow from operations from the Table 2 
balance.  The main items needed to convert the earlier Table 2 balance to net cash flows 
from operations are lending minus repayments, and the net cash flow from the sale and 
purchase of physical assets.  From 1971 onwards the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 
its Government Finance Statistics (GFS) yearbook, calculates these two items.
12  The IMF 
uses a cash-based system to classify revenue and expenditure into its current and capital 
flows. 
   
Lending minus repayments is added to the Table 2 balance for the following reason.  The 
Table 2 balance includes the effects of a government making loans to other parties.  That is, 
when an external party repays part of the principal, this is counted as a cash inflow in the 
Table 2 balance.  Alternatively, when a government lends money to an external party, this is 
counted as a cash outflow in the Table 2 balance.  To exclude these balance sheet effects, it 
is necessary to subtract the repayment cash inflow and to add back the lending cash 
outflow.   
 
We adjust for items included in the adjusted financial balance, but not in the net cash flow 
from operations.  However, there are also items that are included in net cash flows from 
operations but not in the adjusted financial balance.  These include items such as realised 
gains from exchange-rate changes, and cash flows from operations attributable to the 
Reserve Bank.  As these items were not separately disclosed in the financial statements 
prior to 1991, it is not possible to adjust our proxy for net cash flows from operations for 
these items.  However, these items are small in nature, so should not make a significant 
difference to the overall results. 
  
                                                
11 Strictly speaking, the Table 2 Balance Less Lending minus Repayments equals the Financial Balance.  Then 
the Financial Balance less abnormal items (such as changes in the value of foreign currency assets resulting 
from exchange rate movements) equals the Adjusted Financial Balance.  The financial statements show that 
such abnormal items were only recorded from 1991 onwards. 




Table 1: Theoretical Impulse Responses 
 
Response of output level 
 0  1  ￿  ∞  
s ε   +  + ￿ + 
f ε   - 0  ￿  0 
d ε   + 0 ￿  0 
n ε   + 0 ￿  0 
 
Response of real budget balance 
 0  1  ￿  ∞  
s ε   + ? ￿  ? 
f ε   ?  + ￿ + 
d ε   + 0 ￿  0 
n ε   + 0 ￿  0 
 
Response of real private demand 
 0  1  ￿  ∞  
s ε   + ? ￿  ? 
f ε   -  + ￿ + 
d ε   + ? ￿  ? 
n ε   + 0 ￿  0 
 
Response of inflation rate 
 0  1  ￿  ∞  
s ε   0 ?  ￿  ? 
f ε   0 -  ￿  - 
d ε   0  + ￿ + 
n ε   0  + ￿ + 
 




Table 2: Tests for Unit Roots 
Annual 
 (Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic) 
 
  Level  1
st difference 
Log of Real GDP  -1.14  -2.96
* 
Ratio of NCFO to Nominal 
GDP  -2.12 -4.92
** 
Log of Private Demand  -0.96  -3.27
* 
Inflation Rate  -1.77  -5.36
** 
 
Lag lengths in the ADF regressions were chosen by the Bayesian information criterion.  
Asymptotic critical values are: 1 percent, -3.51; 5 percent, -2.89; 10 percent, -2.58 
*   Null hypothesis of unit root rejected at 5 percent level of significance, in favour of 
stationarity 




Table 3: Model Selection Criteria 
Annual, 1976 – 1999 
 
  AIC  HQ 
2 lags, constant  6.7278  7.1966 
2 lags, constant, trend  6.7783  7.2992 
3 lags, constant  6.7225  7.3996 





Table 4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
Decomposition of Variance for Real GDP 
 
Forecasting 





1 52.22  42.95  3.82  1.01 
2 62.78  27.63  8.40  1.18 
3 66.74  26.17  6.31  0.77 
4 76.53  18.32  4.38  0.77 
8 89.70  7.50  2.26  0.53 
16 94.61 3.85  1.24 0.30 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Real Budget Balance  
 
Forecasting 





1 27.38  67.66  0.98  3.98 
2 16.31  76.98  3.03  3.69 
3 13.23  81.72  2.35  2.69 
4 11.77  83.91  1.94  2.39 
8 11.54  83.64  2.53  2.29 
16 12.97  84.05  1.58 1.40 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Real Private Demand 
 
Forecasting 





1 32.35  32.93  32.58  2.14 
2 35.58  23.96  39.73  0.73 
3 34.95  25.44  38.72  0.88 
4 43.97  21.08  33.33  1.62 
8 76.81  8.20  13.93  1.06 
16 84.26 4.21  10.96 0.56 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Inflation Rate 
 
Forecasting 





1 5.35  3.76  9.83  81.06 
2 3.47  4.06  8.74  83.72 
3 5.13  5.79  11.03  78.04 
4 12.85  5.38  10.01  71.76 
8 21.78  3.83  6.45  67.94 





Figure 1: Time-series Observations 








Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions 









Figure 2 cont.: Impulse Response Functions 









Figure 3: Ex Ante Budget Targets: with fiscal shocks excluded 
 








Figure 4: Ex Ante Budget Targets: with fiscal shocks included 
 
New Zealand, Annual, 1976 to 1999 
 
 
 
 